We consider the sequential auction of two stochastically equivalent, independently distributed goods by a seller with private information. The seller's sequencing strategy endogenously generates correlation in the values of the goods across periods, implying the seller has an incentive to impress buyers by leading with the better good. But revenues may be higher if the seller can credibly commit to leading with the worse good, creating a potential con°ict between equilibrium and revenue-maximizing strategies. Either pure strategy reveals information to all buyers about the likely ranking of the goods, thereby reducing individual buyer information rents and generating higher revenues than randomly sequencing sales. This information can be credible since it implies both a favorable signal about one good and an unfavorable signal about the other good. Consistent with the declining price anomaly often observed in auction data, the second period price is necessarily lower than the¯rst period price under the best foot forward strategy.
Introduction
Should the best or worst goods be sold¯rst? This question arises whenever a seller has some private information about the quality of its goods and is concerned about the impact that early sales will have on buyer expectations. For instance, should a government privatize its most promising¯rms¯rst to create a favorable impression on investors? Or should the government warm up investors¯rst with less valuable¯rms?
The traditional counsel to put one's \best foot forward" might seem appropriate, but so does the con°icting advice to save the \best for last".
To help reconcile these opposing perspectives we assume that a seller has imperfect private information about the values of two stochastically equivalent, independently distributed goods to be auctioned sequentially. We¯nd that the seller's sequencing strategy endogenously generates correlation across the two auction periods by truncating the distribution of the second period good. A high¯rst period price therefore raises buyer expectations that the second good is also of high value while a low¯rst period price lowers buyer expectations. This \impression e®ect" from observing the¯rst period price favors a strategy of leading with the better good, implying that the best foot forward strategy is an equilibrium whenever the best for last strategy is, and that best foot forward is the unique pure strategy equilibrium under simple symmetry conditions.
Either pure strategy discloses the seller's private information about the rankings of the two goods and thereby raises expected revenues compared to randomly sequencing the goods. This follows from the \linkage principle" Weber, 1982a & 1982b) which states that publicly revealing information equalizes the knowledge of buyers, leading to more competitive bidding and higher revenues on average. The importance of the linkage principle is often limited because the seller has an incentive to cheat buyers by only revealing good information. We show that the ordinal information embodied in the seller's sequencing strategy can be credible because leading with either the better or the worse good simultaneously sends a favorable signal about one good and an unfavorable signal about the other good. As long as there is a pure strategy equilibrium, the seller can use the sequencing strategy to credibly reveal which good is believed to be better.
Regarding which pure strategy raises expected revenues the most, there is a potential con°ict with the equilibrium strategy. In particular, best for last may be the revenuemaximizing strategy but best foot forward may be the unique pure strategy equilibrium.
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In this case the seller would like to credibly commit to the best for last strategy, but in the absence of a commitment device the incentive to create a good¯rst impression will induce the seller to follow a less pro¯table strategy. Such a con°ict is possible because the endogenous correlation makes the¯rst period price an additional public signal of the quality of the second period good. This public signal reduces buyer information rents in the second period, but it does so to varying degrees depending on which strategy is followed. The best for last strategy implies that the better good is sold after price information about the¯rst period good has been revealed. As long as knowledge of thē rst period price reduces buyer information rents more for the better good than for the worse good, this \warm-up e®ect" implies that best for last yields higher revenues.
Returning to the example of privatization auctions, governments usually sequence the sale of companies over many years rather than following a \big bang" strategy of privatizing¯rms simultaneously (Roland, 2000) . This paper indicates that sequential privatization can increase revenues by credibly revealing seller information. While either sequencing strategy increases revenues, the government might not proceed with the optimal sequence due to the need to make a favorable impression on early buyers. Consistent with the impression e®ect, empirical evidence from Gupta, Ham, and Svejnar (2000) shows that in the mass privatization programs undertaken in the Czech Republic more pro¯table¯rms were sold¯rst.
Sequencing strategies also o®er insight into the \declining price anomaly" or \after-noon e®ect" in which the prices for seemingly identical goods fall during the course of a sequential auction (Ashenfelter, 1989 ). This phenomenon is inconsistent with the law of one price which states that arbitrage should ensure uniform prices. It also contradicts the result from auction theory that public information about bids in earlier auctions of identical goods will instead lead to rising prices due to the linkage principle (Milgrom 1 The con°ict cannot arise in the other direction since best for last is never the unique pure strategy equilibrium. There may also be a con°ict in that there is no pure strategy equilibrium even though either pure strategy generates more revenues than the mixed strategy. (Ginsbergh, 1998) , and special auction rules in which the winner can purchase additional units at the same price (Black and de Meza, 1992) or can choose her preferred item (Gale and Hausch, 1994) .
Our approach suggests a simpler explanation of the afternoon e®ect might su±ce in some cases. Prices fall because the quality of the second good is on average lower than the¯rst good due to a best foot forward strategy based on the seller's private information. For independently distributed goods we¯nd that the negative e®ect on the second period price due to lower quality will outweigh the positive impact on that price due to the linkage principle, ensuring a decline in prices.
Previous analyses of strategic sequencing consider the case where the goods are known to be di®erent based on public information. Benoit and Krishna (2000) show in a complete information environment that leading with the better good maximizes revenue when buyers have budget constraints and act strategically across auctions. Bernhardt and Scoons (1994) consider a private value auction in which the variance of buyer valuations di®ers between two goods and¯nd that the good with highest variance should be sold¯rst. Beggs and Graddy (1997) ¯nd that selling the best good¯rst maximizes revenues when each buyer's private valuation for one good is a multiple of their valuation of the other and buyers demand only one good. Baba (1998)¯nds similar results under the weaker condition that buyer valuations are supermodular in the buyer's signal and the seller's signal. McMillan (1994) notes that the issue of whether to sell rights for large or small regions¯rst was considered in designing spectrum auctions in the U.S., with one factor being that the linkage principle favored a small to large sequence. Our analysis di®ers from the previous literature in that the seller makes a sequencing decision based on her own private information. The sequencing strategy can therefore play a role in credibly revealing the ordinal component of this information to buyers. But because the information is private the strategy that maximizes revenues is not necessarily an equilibrium strategy.
To concentrate on the informational e®ects of sequencing we abstract from strategic buyer behavior across auctions by assuming that there are two di®erent sets of buyers in each period. We thereby preclude any gains from buyer strategies such as underbidding in the¯rst period so as to reduce expectations and win the second period good at a lower price. As the number of buyers becomes larger, or as the interval between auctions increases and the turnover in buyers rises, such strategies become less important.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a simple example of a common value auction that demonstrates the impression e®ect. Section 3 introduces the more general auction model, Section 4 considers equilibrium strategies, Section 5 considers revenue-maximizing strategies when the seller can commit to a strategy, and Section 6 analyzes the afternoon e®ect. Section 7 presents an expanded example that illustrates the key¯ndings and Section 8 concludes the paper.
An Example without Information Rents
The endogenous correlation generated by the seller's sequencing strategy, and the re- Consider the best foot forward strategy of leading with whichever good is better when v a 6 = v b . Since there is only a 1 4 chance that both goods are low value, there is a 3 4 chance that a high value good is sold in the¯rst period, implying the¯rst period price is 3 4 . Regarding the second period price, if the seller follows the strategy then second period buyers observe that a high value good was sold in the¯rst period, truncating chance that v a = v b = 1, implying the remaining good is also high value, the price is 1 3 . If the seller deviates and leads with the worst good then the truncation occurs in the opposite direction as seen from the non-shaded area of the same matrix. Expecting a best foot forward strategy, second period buyers will infer that if the¯rst good was low value the second good must also be low value, implying the second period price is 0. Since deviation is not pro¯table best foot forward is an equilibrium.
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It may seem that the problem is symmetric and best for last is also an equilibrium.
Checking, the¯rst period good is high value only if both goods are high value so thē rst period price is 1 4 . If the seller follows the strategy then second period buyers observe that a low value good was sold in the¯rst period, truncating the joint distribution to the shaded area of the second matrix in Figure 1 . There is then a 2 3 chance that the remaining good is high value, so the price is 2 3 . If the seller deviates and leads with the best good then the truncation again occurs in the opposite direction as seen from the non-shaded area. Expecting a best for last strategy, second period buyers will infer that if the¯rst good was high value the second good must be high value as well, implying a 2 We have ignored the cases where both goods are high or low value and the seller just randomizes.
Adding these cases the expected value from sticking to best foot forward is 3=4+(1=4)(1=3)+(1=2)(1=3)+ (1=4)0 = 1 and the expected value from deviating is 3=4 + (1=4)(1=3) + (1=2)0 + (1=4)0 = 5=6: price of 1. Since deviation is pro¯table best for last is not an equilibrium.
The seller wants to make a favorable impression even though goods a and b are independent because the seller's sequencing strategy endogenously generates correlation across the two periods by truncating the distribution of the second period good. As shown formally in the following sections, this intuition carries over to a more general information environment in which the seller need not be perfectly informed, the buyers have private information that may be stronger than that of the seller, the goods have di®ering values to di®erent buyers, and second period buyers observe only the¯rst period price rather than any direct information about the value of the¯rst period good.
The Model
We construct a standard auction model based on Milgrom and Weber (1982a) which includes both common value and private value features. As in their model, the seller and the buyers all have some private information. Distinct from their model, the seller can choose which of two goods to sell¯rst based on her private information. This has two main implications when the seller follows a pure strategy of leading with the best or worst good. First, the fact that a good is sold in a particular period reveals the relative magnitude of the seller's signal for the good. Second, observing the¯rst period price reveals to second period buyers how highly buyers valued the¯rst good, thereby giving an indication of the seller's actual signal for the¯rst good and, due to the endogenous correlation induced by the sequencing strategy, a signal of the likely value of the seller's signal for the second good. Disentangling the impact of these two sources of information will help us understand both the equilibrium and revenue-maximizing strategies. We set up our formal model below.
Goods, Signals & Values
There is one seller who sells two goods indexed by k 2 fa; bg to two di®erent groups of n¸2 buyers each. For each good k the seller observes a private signal S k 2 fH; Lg ½ R; where H > L: The seller can therefore tell if good k is likely to be above average (S k = H) or below average (S k = L) but nothing more.
3 This information is soft in the sense that the seller cannot credibly reveal it, even though she may like to, except through the sequencing strategy.
The n buyers also observe private signals of the quality of the goods, X ik 2 X ½ R for i 2 f1; :::; ng: We denote by X k = (X 1k ; :::; X nk ) the vector of buyer signals for good k: Let Y ik = max j6 =i X jk be the highest signal of the bidders other than i and let Z k be the second highest signal among the n signals of the buyers of good k. Let f k (x; s) denote the joint density of the random variables (X k ; S k ) associated with good k. These joint densities are independently and identically distributed across k 2 fa; bg.
Following Milgrom and Weber (1982a) we assume that the distribution of the buyers'
private signals does not depend upon the identity of the buyers, or f k is symmetric in its¯rst n arguments, and that f k (x; s) displays a±liation. A±liation implies that if one player (including the seller) observes a high private signal of the value of a good, other players are also more likely to observe high private signals of the value of that good. 4 We assume that for each good k there exists a function V : fH; Lg£X n ! R, strictly increasing in each argument, such that the value of good k to buyer i is given by V ik = V (S k ; X ik ; fX jk g j6 =i ) for each buyer i and for each S k and X k : Since buyers are assumed to be symmetric, the valuations of all buyers for good k depend on the seller's signal in the same way, and the valuation of each buyer depends on the signals of the other buyers in the same way and does not depend on the identity of the other buyers. 5 Let V k = (V 1k ; :::; V nk ) be the vector of buyer valuations for good k: Under our assumptions of a±liation and the monotonicity of the function V (¢), the random variables (V k ; X k ; S k ) are a±liated as shown in Milgrom and Weber (1982a) . To simplify 3 By limiting the seller's signal space we can restrict attention to the simplest and most intuitive sequencing strategies. When S has more than two elements (for example, S is a continuum) the seller could have more complicated strategies such as selling the better good¯rst only if the gap between signals is su±ciently large. 4 A formal de¯nition is provided in the Appendix. Tong (1980) and Milgrom and Weber (1982a) provide a more extensive discussion of a±liation and its implications. notation we denote by f (v; x; s) the joint density of (V k ; X k ; S k ); which is also distributed
Seller's Strategies and the Timing Structure For a seller with signals S k = H and S k 0 = L where k 6 = k 0 , the possible sequencing strategies are to sell the good with the high signal¯rst (best foot forward or BFF strategy), to sell the good with the low signal¯rst (best for last or BFL strategy) or to randomize (mixed strategy). 6 When the signals for the two goods are identical the seller is indi®erent about the sequencing strategy and leading with either good is strategically equivalent.
The timing structure is as follows: (1) The seller observes her signals and decides which good to sell¯rst. (2) The buyers of the good the seller sells¯rst note that their good is being sold¯rst, observe their private signals, and bid for the good. (3) The buyers of the good the seller sells second note that their good is being sold second, observe their private signals, observe the¯rst period price, and bid for the good. As an interesting and useful benchmark we will also consider the \no price observed" (henceforth NPO) game where the second period buyers do not observe the¯rst period price.
Equilibrium We assume that the identical buyers for each good play a symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the auction given their correct beliefs about the seller's strategies and their information, and that the seller's strategy is sequentially rational given the buyers' beliefs.
The Auction, Prices and Bids Because of the symmetry in the model it is more useful to look at the auction for each good k rather than the auction in each period. The auctions in the two periods are di®erent because the buyers may believe that the seller is treating the two periods di®erently via her sequencing strategy. Suppose that buyers believe that the seller will follow a best foot forward strategy. Then, if good k is sold in the¯rst period, buyers in that period believe that the seller will sell the good with the higher signal¯rst, or S k = maxfS a ; S b g. On the other hand if buyers believe that the seller will follow a best for last strategy then they believe that S k = minfS a ; S b g when good k is sold¯rst.
We can capture buyer beliefs about the seller's sequencing strategy by assuming that for each good k all buyers of that good observe a public signal
¿ H > ¿ L where ¿ k = ¿ H if buyers of good k believe that S k = maxfS a ; S b g, and ¿ k = ¿ L if they believe that S k = minfS a ; S b g. So ¿ k is an ordinal signal that partially reveals the seller's private information S k . If buyers think that the seller will follow a best foot forward strategy then buyers of good k will publicly observe ¿ k = ¿ H if and only if good k is sold¯rst, while the opposite is true for the best for last strategy. In the NPO game the ordinal signal is the only signal that buyers publicly observe in either auction. In the sequential game second period buyers of good k also observe the¯rst period price
Let Ã k denote a generic public signal observed by all buyers of good k. For instance, this may include the period signal alone or the period signal and the price of the other good. The price of good k can be written as a function of the private and public signals that buyers receive, P k (X k ; Ã k ). When buyers believe that the seller is randomizing they will ignore the public signals so the price will depend only on the buyer signals for good k, and can be written as P k (X k ).
We assume that the seller employs a second price auction to sell her good, but the results generalize to other auction forms such as the English auction and the¯rst price auction. 8 As is well-known, in a second price auction each buyer bids the expected value of the good given that the realized value of her signal is tied with the highest signal for the other bidders. The winner pays the second highest bid in the auction.
Since valuations do not depend on the identity of the buyer, for any public signal Ã k we can write the expected value of the good to buyer i as
7 We will also consider the case where second period buyers observe a more general public signal of the¯rst period good. 8 We do not consider reserve prices and entry fees. More generally, we do not consider mechanism design issues but instead take the selling mechanism of a second price auction as given.
Therefore the bidding function of the buyers is given by
Following Milgrom and Weber (1982a) we know that a±liation implies this bidding function is strictly increasing in its¯rst argument. 9 As a result the price in this second price auction can be written as
where 2 nd maxf¢g is the function which chooses the second highest value, Z k , among the buyers' signals, fX ik g.
Equilibrium Strategies
Sequencing a®ects buyer information via the period in which a good is sold and thē rst period price. To understand the impact of these two sources of information on equilibrium strategies, we start by considering the NPO game where the buyers do not observe the¯rst period price. Without¯rst period price information the two pure strategies are identical subject to renaming the periods. So the question is simply whether the seller has an incentive to sell the better good in the period which buyers expect it to be sold or to deviate and trick the buyers by selling it in the other period.
For a seller with one high signal and one low signal, 10 the symmetry between goods k and k 0 implies that the expected revenues from following either pure strategy are higher than from deviating if and only if
If selling the better good in one period raises the price in that period just as much as it lowers the price in the other period, condition (4) 
constant in z then it can be shown that the equilibrium condition holds weakly.
More generally, condition (4) 
and
Proof. In the Appendix. ¥ Now consider the impact of observing the¯rst period price. If buyers believe the seller follows either pure strategy, a high¯rst period price raises the probability that the seller received two high signals, and therefore raises the estimated value of the second 11 Note that condition (C) in Proposition 1 is clearly satis¯ed when V (S k ; X ik ; fX jk g j6 =i ) is supermodular and n = 2. For an English auction, the analogue of condition (C) is guaranteed by the supermodularity of V for all n because the n ¡ 2 lowest bids are observed publicly by all bidders.
The regularity condition (S) is satis¯ed if, for example, X is a compact set and the likelihood ratio is continuous in z:
period good for each buyer. The¯rst period price is more likely to be high when the good with the highest signal is sold in the¯rst period since¯rst period buyers are more likely to observe high private signals and bid correspondingly when the seller's signal is high. We call the impact of observing the¯rst period price the \impression e®ect".
Proposition 2 (Impression E®ect) For both the best foot forward and best for last strategies, observation of the¯rst period price by second period buyers raises (lowers) the expected second period price if the seller sells a good with a high (low) signal in thē rst period: for all ¿ 2 f¿ H ; ¿ L g, s 2 fH; Lg;
Proof. In the Appendix. Corollary 1: If buyers of good k observe any signal » k 0 which is a±liated with X k 0 and
Proof. Follows analogously from the proof of Proposition 2. ¥ For simplicity we will continue under the assumption that the¯rst period price rather than any other signal is observed but all of our subsequent results on equilibrium strategies, revenue-maximizing strategies, and price trends hold for a more general signal.
If the¯rst period price is not observed the best foot forward and best for last strategies are equivalent so either both are equilibria or neither are equilibria. The impression e®ect adds a boost in favor of the best foot forward strategy and against the best for last strategy, implying that the equilibrium condition for the former is always less strict than that for the latter. Thus whenever best for last is an equilibrium best foot forward must also be an equilibrium, but not the converse. One equilibrium which always exists is where the seller plays a mixed strategy of randomly sequencing the sale of the goods. If buyers expect such randomization the seller is indi®erent between sequencing strategies because the¯rst period price conveys no information.
Proposition 3 (i) The equilibrium condition for best foot forward (best for last) is less (more) strict when the¯rst period price is observed than when it is not. (ii) Best foot forward is an equilibrium whenever best for last is but not the converse. (iii) The mixed strategy is always an equilibrium.
Proof. Using the symmetry between good k and good k 0 , the equilibrium condition for the best foot forward strategy can be written as,
and that for the best for last strategy can be written as
The proof of (i) follows from Proposition 2 by observing that the left-hand side of (6) is greater than the left-hand side of (4) while the right-hand side of (6) is less than the right-hand side of (4), and similarly that the left-hand side of (7) is less than the left-hand side of (4) while the right-hand side of (7) is greater than the right-hand side of (4). The proof of (ii) then follows directly since the two strategies are equivalent in the NPO game. The proof of (iii) follows from the fact that if the buyers believe that the seller does not condition the sequencing decision on her information, then all sequencing strategies for the seller yield the same expected revenues. ¥ The¯rst part of this proposition implies that best foot forward is an equilibrium if (4) holds and that best foot forward is the unique pure strategy equilibrium if (4) holds with equality. As the following section shows, equilibrium is important in this model not only in predicting behavior but in allowing the seller to credibly reveal information. The¯rst period price provides additional information regarding the actual realization of the seller's signal, S k : By the linkage principle the expected revenues from the BFF or BFL strategy are therefore higher when buyers observe the¯rst period price compared to the NPO game. On the other hand, for the mixed strategy the expected revenues will be the same for the NPO and sequential games because, due to the independent values of the two goods, the price of good k 0 contains no information for the buyers of good k the seller does not condition her sequencing on her information. We collect these results into our next proposition.
Revenue-Maximizing Strategies
Proposition 4 (i) When the¯rst period price is not observed both pure strategies generate higher expected revenues than the mixed strategy.
(ii) When the¯rst period price is observed both pure strategies generate higher expected revenues than when it is not.
(iii) The mixed strategy generates the same expected revenues whether or not the¯rst period price is observed.
Proof. Follows from the discussion above and Theorem 9 in Milgrom and Weber (1982a) . ¥ A natural question is whether the expected revenues from best foot forward and best for last can be ranked. Best for last has the apparent advantage that the more valuable good is sold in the second period when the public information from the¯rst period price has become available, thereby reducing buyer information rents for the more valuable good.
Proposition 5 (Warm-up E®ect) Best for last expected revenues are higher than best foot forward expected revenues if and only if the price signal reduces information rents more for the good the seller believes to be better.
Proof.
For the better good, information rents are
. By the same logic, the reduction in rents for the worse good is
Rearranging, the former reduction is greater if and only if
or expected revenues from best for last are higher than from best foot forward. is it credibly reveals ordinal information if the strategy is an equilibrium. If the strategy which maximizes revenues is not an equilibrium, the seller will have to choose a di®erent strategy. For instance, in the example of Section 7 both the BFF and BFL strategies generate higher revenues than the mixed strategy, and BFL generates slightly higher revenues than BFF, but only BFF is an equilibrium.
The Afternoon E®ect
Empirical evidence indicates that the prices of seemingly identical goods often fall during the course of a sequential auction. While a number of di®erent approaches have been taken to explain this anomaly, they are focused primarily on buyer characteristics and strategies. We¯nd that the seller's sequencing strategy o®ers an alternative explanation for declining prices. Prices may fall simply because on average the second good is of lower value than the¯rst good based on the seller's private information.
The following proposition shows that under the BFF strategy the linkage principle's positive e®ect on second period prices is outweighed by the negative e®ect of a lower value good being sold in that period, ensuring that average prices fall. 12 The afternoon e®ect can therefore arise endogenously out of the seller's choice of an equilibrium sequencing strategy.
Proposition 6 (i) Under the best foot forward strategy the expected¯rst period price is 12 The proof relies on the independence of the valuations of the two goods a and b. If the valuations were su±ciently correlated the linkage principle's e®ect could be dominant.
higher than the expected second period price:
(ii) Under the best for last strategy the expected¯rst period price is lower than the expected second period price:
(iii) Under the mixed strategy the expected¯rst period price and expected second period
Proof. In the Appendix. ¥
In this model the afternoon e®ect does not imply violation of the law of one price.
When good k is better based on the seller's information it sells in the¯rst period at a higher average price than good k 0 , but unconditional on the seller's private information both goods sell at the same expected price.
An Example with Information Rents
This section expands on the initial example of Section 2 by allowing buyers to have private information, by allowing the seller signal to be noisy, and by assuming that second period buyers only observe the¯rst period price rather than the exact value of the¯rst period good.
As in the earlier example, V k 2 f0; 1g where Pr[
for k 2 fa; bg. Regarding the seller's signal S k 2 fL; Hg, let
for k 2 fa; bg: Note that the signals are uninformative when ® = . For each good there are n = 2 buyers who each receive a noisy binary signal of the quality of the good being sold in that period, X k 2 fL; Hg, where conditional on the value of the good. We continue to use a second price auction.
First considering equilibrium strategies, we know from Proposition 2 that the impression e®ect favors a best foot forward strategy. sticking to the BFL strategy. 13 BFF is therefore the unique pure strategy equilibrium.
14 Note that when¯is very low the¯rst period price provides no information to second period buyers and when¯is very high second period buyers are so well informed that rst period price information is redundant. In either case the sequencing strategy is irrelevant since the impression e®ect of the¯rst period price disappears.
Regarding revenue-maximizing strategies, Proposition 4 states that revenues from either the BFF or BFL strategies should be higher than those from the mixed strategy Since BFF is an equilibrium for all parameter values, the BFF strategy can credibly reveal seller information to buyers. Figure 3 shows BFF revenues minus mixed strategy revenues as a percent of the latter when¯varies from In this example the revenue gains from BFL are slightly higher than those of BFF for all parameter values, but BFL is not an equilibrium so the seller will have di±culty committing to the strategy.
From Proposition 6 we know that the expected second period price is lower than the expected¯rst period price when the seller follows the best foot forward strategy. Figure   4 shows this afternoon e®ect when ® and¯jointly vary from 
so that
where
Note that ¢(z) is non{decreasing in z by condition (C). By a±liation between X ik ; Y ik and S k , l(z) in non{decreasing in z: Further, h 0 (l) > 0 if and only if
Since the left-hand side of the expression above is continuous and monotonically decreasing in¸; equal to 0 at¸= 1; and approaching in¯nity as¸goes to 0; such a¸exists by condition (S) and the intermediate value theorem. Therefore, for¸<¸; h(l(Z k )) is increasing in Z k : But then, by a±liation between Z k and S k , the expression in (E) is increasing in s; so that (4) holds. ¥ Proof of Proposition 2: Impression E®ect Note¯rst that, from the de¯nition of the price of good k, P k (X k ; ¿ k );
Now, for any x; y; ¿; z
By independence of the random variables related to good k from good k 0 the density of Z k 0 conditional on X ik ; Y ik ; ¿ k and S k 0 depends only on S k 0 :
Using this we obtain
Note that for¯xed z; ¿; by a±liation of S k 0 with Z k 0 we have
where in the last line we have made use of the fact that, since we are looking at second price auctions, observing the price of good k 0 ; P k 0 ; is equivalent to observing the second highest signal Z k 0 , from the perspective of the buyers of good k: Similarly,
This concludes the proof. ¥ Proof of Proposition 6: The Afternoon E®ect We start with the proof of (i).
Step 1 The expected second period price under the best foot forward strategy is higher when second period buyers directly observe the seller's¯rst period signal than when they only observe the¯rst period price:
This follows directly from the fact that the signal f¿ L ; S k 0 g contains more information about S k than the signal f¿ L ; P k 0 g. See Theorem 9 in Milgrom and Weber (1982a).
Step 2 The expected second period price under the mixed strategy is higher than under the best foot forward strategy when the second period buyers directly observe the seller's¯rst period signal:
Note that, by de¯nition, where the inequality follows from a±liation of ¿ k with the other random variables related to good k, the next equality follows from the fact that S k 0 is independent of S k (and contains information about S k only in conjunction with ¿ k ) and the last equality is de¯nitional. Therefore,
Step 3 The expected¯rst period price is higher under the best foot forward strategy than under the mixed strategy:
Note that P k (X k ; ¿ H ) = v k (Z k ; Z k ; ¿ H ) and P k (X k ) = v where the inequality follows from a±liation. Thus
This concludes the proof of (i). The proof of (ii) is similar and that of (iii) follows immediately from the inability of the mixed strategy to reveal information. ¥
